Today's entry in the Lexicon is "Hegelian dialectic." Perhaps I am mistaken about this, but it seems to me like Hegel is somewhat less fashionable these days than he might have once been (perhaps this is because phenomenology is somewhat less dominant in Western philosophy than it was fifty years ago). Regardless, I think his notion of dialectic is extremely important to any kind of basic understanding of history, and I also think it coheres very nicely with some scholars' insistence on historicizing culture and discourse (Taylor and Toulmin immediately leap to mind, see below).
What is the Hegelian dialectic? As I understand it, it describes a certain model of history, a way of thinking about cultural, intellectual, economic, and social history. It can be described quite succintly. In any given society, there are sets of ideas, conditions, and values that enjoy a kind of establishment; they are more or less accepted. This is called the "thesis." Eventually, these accepted ideas, conditions, and values are challenged by an opposing set of ideas, conditions, and values, called the "antithesis." From the clash of these forces and influences, an amalgam is formed, called the "synthesis." Thus, the Hegelian dialectic is "thesis" + "antithesis" yields "synthesis."
It is crucial to note that the dialectic (being a dialectic) is iterative. The process continues to repeat itself, with new syntheses eventually concreting and becoming established theses. In addition, one need not oversimplify -- at any one time, there can be (and likely are) multiple theses interacting with multiple antithesis which informs and constructs multiple syntheses. Part of the reason the Hegelian dialectic is important is its dynamism, IMO.
Finally, a caveat: Hegel linked his model of history to his belief in the inevitable progress of man, that through iterations of the dialectic humanity would continue to reach higher achievements. I think it is important to observe that the significance of his dialectic is not contingent on the merits of the belief in the inevitable progress of man. That is, it is entirely possible to see the dialectic as a useful prism for perceiving all manner of aspects about history without maintaining that iterations of the dialectic will necessarily lead to human or social progress.
Why should the Hegelian dialectic matter to the medical humanist? For one, it implies a point articulated by many contemporary scholars, that intellectual movements and traditions must be historicized -- they must be understood in context of the ideas and conditions out of which they arose (and, pace Hegel, against which such ideas and conditions were opposed or were used to challenge). In his classic essay "Two Theories of Modernity," Taylor warns against viewing cultural and intellectual conceptual schemes as acultural and ahistorical. A peculiarly modern consciousness was not simply an inevitable result of progress and natural science -- it must be seen in light of the particular ideas and material conditions out of which it arose. It must be contextualized and historicized.
Contextualizing and historicizing modernity is Toulmin's project in Cosmopolis, as he explains some of the material conditions of the 17th century that resulted in thinkers like Montaigne and Erasmus on the one hand, and Descartes, Galileo, and Bacon on the other, adopting wildly divergent ways of conceiving the world.
The point, as I see it, is that understanding the modern intellectual tradition in the West seems to require an understanding of past theses, antitheses, and syntheses that inform and construct that tradition. Thus contextualized, some important pieces of the intellectual and cultural histories of modernity fall into place. The metaphor I like to use to describe this phenomenon is that of flour and eggs in finished cake -- you may not see them, but they surely construct the perceptible product. They are in every bite, and understanding the cake isn't really possible without understanding the dynamic interactions by which the flour and eggs are baked into the cake.
Thus, understanding the physician-patient relationship requires an understanding of the dialectical roots of the relationship -- where it come from, how it evolved, etc. -- in other words, an understanding of some of the theses, antitheses, and syntheses that inform and construct the current tradition(s). Understanding, to use Shai Lavi's recent book, current attitudes and practices towards euthanasia and dying in the U.S. requires analysis or at least cognizance of some of the dialectical attitudes and practices out of which our current practices and attitudes arise. It is no accident, then, that Lavi begins his analysis of modern attitudes in the 19th century. To understand the Hegelian dialectic is, IMO, to understand the importance of contextualizing and historicizing practices.
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Bibliography
Charles Taylor, "Two Theories of Modernity," 25, no. 2, Hastings Center Report (1995): 24-33.
Stephen Toulmin, Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity (New York: University of Chicago Press, 1990).
J.M.E. McTaggart, Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic (1896).
Charles Taylor, Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977).
Charles Taylor, Hegel and Modern Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).
Hans-Georg Gadamer, Hegel's Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical Studies, trans. P. Christopher Smith, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982).
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