On Scientism

Frank Pasquale is up to his standard level of high-quality blogging in this post on the apparent objectivity of legal economic theory.  He quotes Hackney for the proposition that "law and economics often cloaks ideological determinations—particularly regarding the distribution of wealth—under the cover of science."  Of course, one of the most influential critiques in late 20th century philosophy of science highlights the absurdity of the notion of a "neutral" scientific praxis, one set apart from social influences.  In my undergraduate thesis, I traced this critique in Hume's analysis on causation, and examined some of the contemporary philosophers of science (Kuhn, Feyerabend, Davidson, Quine, and Keller) who develop the idea of scientific practice as a practice, as a value-laden phenomena.

Indeed, if science is seen as a social practice -- and how could it be otherwise? -- then all manner of social and cultural influences come in to play.  This is why medical humanities scholars often speak of a culture of biomedicine.  That biomedical practice and thought is a culture is basically a given for medical anthropologists and medical sociologists alike.  Wittgenstein's evocative phrase "form of life" leaps to mind, as does one of my own favorite items of technical jargon: Weltanschauung.

Keller, whose work my peers know I am particularly fond of, uses an excellent feedback loop metaphor to emphasize the discursive nature of scientific practice.  The metaphors scientists use are adopted in public discourse about science, and that discourse in turn shapes scientific practice itself, and the process repeats itself iteratively.  Her best example of this phenomenon is scientists' use of the telegraph metaphor in conceptualizing genetic science, which usage I think helps illuminate the reasons why a kind of genetic determinism (at least about causation) still enjoys the currency it does.

Given these views, I am always mystified by what I perceive as attempts to make humanistic or social scientific analyses "resemble" the methodologies and kinds of evidence favored by natural scientific analyses.  The entire point is that many of the objects of inquiry humanities scholars and social scientists are concerned with directly shape and produce scientific practice.  Science can and should be studied with a variety of lenses, especially because many important facets of scientific practice are not fruitfully examined purely by the methods of the natural sciences.  It is far from clear that the most rewarding tools for thinking about science are those tools used in the natural sciences.

I don't know where have some ideas about how we came up with the bizarre notion that knowledge that is not acquired through the tools of the natural sciences is inferior to knowledge that is so acquired.  That belief is itself what David Tracy aptly terms the "scientist pretension."  This is the very core of scientism.

My own original research will critique the cultural process by which subjective, contingent, particular modalities of knowledge acquisition are denigrated in favor of objectifying, universalizing, generalizing modalities (re: scientific modalities).  This phenomenon is one of the most mischievous legacies of modernity, IMO.  That it still continues to shape so much current discourse suggests that for all our talk of postmodernism, we may yet remain late moderns in some important sense.

DIALOGUE: Jeff Lipshaw over at Legal Profession Blog.

Comments

[Frank]

Thanks for the kind words. You've made the point more sharply and directly than I have: science can't "jump over its own shadow" by using its own tools to study itself. Rather, some other disciplines need to guide us when we attempt to judge the wisdom of so-called scientific advances.

My worry is that an increasing association of rigor with scientific method will marginalize the voices of those who prefer a synthetic over an analytic approach....i.e., those who want to comment on a big picture, rather than follow more reductionist and fragmentary research programs.

[Daniel Goldberg]

I agree. What's fascinating is that scientism itself affects scientific practice, and not entirely for the better, either. As I remarked in an email to Jeff, evidence-based medicine is a particularly interesting lens through which to examine some of this issues insofar as EBM involves engagement of the thorniest epistemic questions.

Yet, one of the more valid critiques of EBM is that it relies far too much on the randomized controlled trial in prioritizing and ranking evidence. Qualitative evidence is denigrated, when, for some objects of inquiry, qualitative evidence is either the best or the only means of engaging the phenomenon.

It is why the term empiricism itself is, among some quarters, elided with quantitative analyses favored by the natural sciences. Empiricism historically did not mean this, and it need not mean this now.

A commitment to EBM involves using all available evidence to guide practice. It's partly why I think philosophy of science is really important in thinking about EBM.

(I've mentioned the RCT issue here and here on the blog).

I guess I'm particularly partial to a big picture view, because I think the medical humanities are conducive to that kind of perspective.

[N=1]

This also applies to professional nursing research. As an FYI, two qualitative research authors of note: Patricia Munhall and Christine Tanner.